The who, what, and where of gun control
A Second Opinion is a recurring series by Haley Proctor on the Second Amendment and constitutional litigation.
My previous column examined what it means for a gun control measure to fit within “the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” This month I want to focus on how the court has analyzed gun regulations that limit (1) who may possess a firearm, (2) what arms people may own or carry, and (3) where they may take them.
Who may keep and bear arms?
As of writing, the court’s latest word on the Second Amendment concerns the “who” of gun control: may the government permissibly restrict the ability of certain types of people to keep and bear arms? The court provided important guidance on that question in the 2024 case of United States v. Rahimi, but significant questions remain open.
The Second Amendment secures to “the people” the right “to keep and bear Arms.” In District of Columbia v. Heller, the court held that “the people” refers “to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” This means that the “plain text” contains no limitation on the right that would permit the government to deprive some category of persons of firearms without meeting its burden to show that the deprivation is consistent with the “Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”
The court has occasionally used the phrase “law-abiding, responsible citizens” to describe “the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right.” Some have inferred that this phrase limits the category of people who may assert a Second Amendment right. The court’s decision in Rahimi made clear that this reading was mistaken. If the government wishes to limit the ability of any “member[ ] of the political community” to keep or bear arms – even those who break the law or might be thought to be irresponsible – it must point to a historical tradition that justifies doing so.
Rahimi recognized a historical tradition that “allows the Government to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to the physical safety of others,” “temporarily.” And it identified one group of individuals who the government may disarm consistent with that tradition: individuals presently under a restraining order issued upon a finding that the recipient poses “a credible threat to the physical safety” of another.
This term, the court has taken up the “who” question once more. The case of United States v. Hemani requires it to decide whether the same tradition permits the government to disarm individuals who unlawfully use drugs. Several additional “who” questions are in the offing.
First, despite Heller’s holding that the “people” includes “all members of the political community,” and despite the fact that 18-to-20 year-olds are undoubtedly part of the political community (and many shoulder the responsibility to bear arms for that community), some courts have continued to hold that they are not part of the “people” who enjoy a right to keep and bear arms. These courts have therefore rejected challenges to laws restricting adults’ ability to purchase or carry firearms until they reach the age of 21. There is a circuit split on this question, and the court has been holding several petitions since November. It could be that the court plans to grant, vacate, and remand these cases in light of Hemani, but given that they focus on the meaning of “people” and a different aspect of the historical regulatory tradition, it’s doubtful that Hemani will supply much guidance.


